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Summary: This report (1) undertakes the first quantitative assessment of the impact of 
the Argentine crisis on the Spanish economy in terms of gross domestic product. The 
conclusion reached is that in the period 1999-2002 Spain’s GDP would have risen an 
additional 0.8% were it not for the crisis. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Argentine crisis had an important impact on the Spanish media. In the four years the 
crisis has lasted so far, what is popularly known as the ‘Argentine tragedy’ has been 
followed very closely by Spain’s journalists, be it from an economic or a socio-political 
standpoint. This close concern is understandable for various reasons. Naturally, there was 
the emotional concern prompted by the historical ties linking Spain and Argentina. This 
was important enough, but was outweighed by other factors. To begin with, the Argentine 
crisis was the largest default on repayment of sovereign debt in world history, US$50 
billion. At the beginning of 2002 the Argentine government said that it could not meet 
repayments as a consequence of the dramatic economic problems the country faced. 
Then there was the magnitude of the crisis. Between 1998 and 2002 Argentine GDP fell 
by 18%, its currency lost 70% of its value and earnings per capita in dollar terms went 
down by nearly 68%. And, in third place, there was the run on the banks and the 
international alarm generated by the scenes witnessed when the government declared 
first the corralito, then the corralón, the two clampdowns on deposit withdrawals. 
However, when all is said and done, the main reason for the interest shown in Argentina 
by the Spanish press is the significant presence of Spanish companies in that country. 
According to Chislett (2003), direct investment in Argentina between 1992 and 2001 
totalled some €26.3 billion. 
 
It is ironic that despite the interest here in the Argentine tragedy, there are very few 
academic analyses or quantitative assessments of its effects on Spain. The general view 
seems to be that the effect on the Spanish economy was negligible. This is attributed to 
two factors: the strong growth of the economy in the period 1998-2001 and, secondly, the 
fact that trade relations between Spain and Argentina are relatively small, leading to the 
conclusion that the risk of Spain catching an ‘Argentine cold’ was minimal. 
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Yet it should be emphasised that the channels by which the Argentine crisis could have 
spread to the Spanish economy are not the usual ones. Spain is a highly internationalised 
economy (2)
 
and the range and variety of its trading partners is but one factor. The 
contagion channels analysed here number six, three factors relating to the ‘real’ economy 
and three financial factors. 
 
Of the three dangers to the real economy, the first is via trade, studied here on a 
heterodox basis. The results show that the effect of the Argentine crisis by this route is 
limited. As for other routes, less well known and understood in this country, the effects 
proved to be a mixed bag in terms of size and effect, some positive, others negative. The 
second route for contagion was the cost to Spanish companies operating in Argentina. 
And the third route into the real economy is Argentine immigration. The crisis forced many 
Argentines to leave their country and Spain is one of the favoured destinations for skilled 
workers. 
 
Of the financial channels we analysed three: (1) the impact on Spanish bond spreads; (2) 
the cost of the default itself; and (3) the contagion effect on the stock market. The 
evidence found was that the financial effect was by no means negligible. Indeed, the 
study shows that the Argentine crisis made significant inroads on the financial wealth of 
the average Spanish household. 
 
Aside from a quantitative assessment of the damage, we also try to measure the effect of 
the crisis on Spanish economic growth. For this we used new methods, so a plea for 
caution in interpreting the results is not out of place. From an academic standpoint many 
of the results we give are open to challenge, given the hypotheses and assumptions 
employed. However, faced with the alternative of painting nothing but a qualitative picture, 
we thought it worthwhile to take research one step further, recognising the pitfalls but 
trusting that the ensuing debate among academics and professionals would justify our 
temerity. The quantitative results suggest that the Argentine tragedy detracted 0.8 
percentage points of growth from the Spanish economy between 1998 and 2002. 
 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 looks at the size of Spanish investment in 
Argentina. Section 3 is a brief chronological account of the crisis itself. Section 4 looks at 
contagion via trade using a new quantitative form of analysis. Section 5 quantifies the cost 
of the crisis for Spanish companies installed in Argentina. Section 7 looks at the three 
most widely recognised channels of financial contagion. And Section 8 contains our 
conclusions. 
 
Spanish Investment in Argentina 
Argentina is one of the prime targets of Spanish overseas investment. According to 
Chislett (2003) Spanish companies invested US$26.3 billion in Argentina over the period 
1992-2001, a long way ahead of the United States, which only managed US$9.1 billion. 
To get an idea of the size of this amount, it represents 5.4% of gross capital formation in 
Argentina in the ten-year period. It is also worth noting that Argentina was the Latin 
American country in which Spain invested most heavily. 33% of Spain’s entire investment 
in the region went to Argentina, the same proportion as went to Brazil, despite being a 
smaller economy. 
 
According to a survey conducted by the Centre for Latin American Studies (CESLA) in 
2002 the Spanish Chamber of Commerce in Argentina showed as registered 385 Spanish 
companies operating in Argentina, though only 50 of them were active at that time. The 
main ones are (3): Repsol YPF, Santander Central Hispano, BBVA, Telefónica, Endesa, 
Gas Natural, Mapfre and Aguas de Barcelona. The names themselves give a rough idea 
of what sectors are most attractive to Spanish investment: oil & gas; banking; 
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telecommunications; electric energy; water management; and insurance. According to a 
study by the Foundation of the Spanish Chamber of Commerce in Argentina (FUCAES) 
conducted in May 2002, Spanish companies provided jobs directly to 70,000 employees, 
obtaining a turnover of 17 billion pesos in 2001. Spanish companies alone generated 
some 2.9% of Argentina’s GDP in 2000 and 2001. Even more significant is the 
contribution of Spanish companies to the Argentine treasury, more than 11% of its total 
revenues in those two years. 
 
A Brief Overview of the Argentine Crisis 
Although the Argentine crisis broke out at the start of 2002, it had been simmering for a 
number of years. The economy went into formal recession in the third quarter of 1998, 
coinciding with the Russian default and the general flight of international capital from the 
emerging economies. This had a particularly drastic impact on a country whose money 
supply, due to the fixed exchange rate, was determined by external reserves. It meant 
that an external crisis immediately become a domestic monetary squeeze. The fixed 
exchange rate also prevented adjusting the current account other than by placing an 
additional squeeze on real output. For four years the country survived in a state of 
continual recession. The cumulative fall in activity from the third quarter of 1998 to the end 
of 2002 was 18%. As a result, output in 2002 was similar to that of 1993. A decade was 
wasted. 
 
Graph 1. Argentine GDP in real terms (millions of 1993 pesos) 
 
 
 
Despite the gradual build-up to the crisis, when it finally broke, it broke hard. The most 
obvious signs were in the last few days of 2001 and the first of 2002, when four things 
happened more or less simultaneously. 
 
• Freeze on bank withdrawals. In December 2001 the government led by President 
De La Rúa, in an effort to halt the run on the banks, imposed stiff restrictions on 
withdrawals from deposit accounts, both sight and term, the so-called corralito and 
corralón. Over the preceding twelve months the banking system had already seen 
its deposits shrink by 19.5%, which gives an idea of the silent but inexorable 
advance of the crisis (4) prior to the panic bank withdrawals at the end of 
November 2001. 
 
• Political and social unrest. In December 2001 middle-class Argentines marched 
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through the streets of Buenos Aires, making the fearful din known as the 
cacerolazo, in protest at the freeze on bank deposits. On 21 December President 
De La Rúa resigned in the face of his evident inability to contain the situation. 
Ramón Puerta, speaker of the Senate, stepped in to replace him, in the absence 
of a Vice-President, who had resigned earlier. On 23 December, Rodriguez Saá, 
governor of the province of San Luis, took over the presidential reins. But he was 
forced to drop them on 31 December when it was seen that he did not enjoy the 
support of the other governors. In his week at the top, Rodríguez Saá declared 
Argentina’s default on privately held public debt to the rapturous applause and 
random bear-hugs of the members of Congress. Eventually, Eduardo Duhalde 
was sworn in as President by Congress on 2 January 2002. 
 
• Declaration of default. This mainly affected private overseas bondholders, in 
possession of some 35% of the US$ 144.5 billion which Argentina owed as at 
December 2001. Domestic holders of public debt, notably banks and pension 
funds, had already had to restructure their repayment rights in November 2001, 
when the net present value of their holdings sank significantly. 
 
• Breach of the Convertibility Act on 6 January 2002. This act of legislation, 
establishing parity between the US dollar and the Argentine peso, had been 
passed in 1991. From 6 January on, Argentina set up a conversion fund, which is 
an extreme version of a fixed exchange rate, before finally moving to a flexible 
rate. As a result, the official rate of exchange moved from US$/peso 1.00 at the 
beginning of the year to US$/peso 3.85 on 25 June, ie, a depreciation of 74% in 
just six months. The peso rebounded in June to end the year on US$/peso 3.36. 
 
The crisis of 2002 warrants special attention. It was the worst recession in Argentina’s 
recent history, with a fall in GDP of 10.9% in the first twelve months and of over 16% in 
the first quarter. The slowdown in domestic demand was even worse, shrinking by 17.1% 
on an annualised basis. The crisis did not occur in an overheated economy which is 
where exchange-rate crises normally strike, but in an economy that had been in the 
doldrums for four years, in which time GDP had shrunk by 8.4%. The crisis was also more 
severe than other similar events in emerging countries (see Table 1). It was not simply 
economic, but political, social and institutional also. The end result was a breakdown in 
confidence that accelerated the capital flight begun in 2001. Some US$ 13.5 billion, 16% 
of GDP, fled the country in 2002. Logically, this caused a spectacular adjustment at 
current account level, which registered a surplus of 10 decimal points. 
 
Despite the widespread uncertainty and the political errors of the early days, the main 
threat to the Argentine economy did not materialise. Once the fixed exchange rate had 
gone, many economists feared a return to the hyperinflation and random fiscal policy of 
former years. Memories of those times meant that in the first half of 2002 people 
struggled hard to get their hands on dollars, sending the exchange rate plummeting even 
further. But initial fears of an outbreak of the vicious circle devaluation-inflation-
devaluation proved unfounded due to the contracting money supply (5)
 
and restrictive 
policies. After an initial jump in prices, inflation returned to monthly rates of less than one 
per cent and the exchange rate began to backtrack. At last, the real economy began to 
show signs of recovery in the second half of 2002, four years after the recession had set 
in. GDP began to climb as domestic goods took the place of imports and resources were 
finally invested in their production. 
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Table 1. Relative Cost of the Argentine Adjustment 
 
 Devaluation Default Quarterly 
GDP 
Trade balance 
(% of GDP) 
years 
Current account 
(% of GDP) years 
   T+1 T+4 T-
1 
T+1 T+2 T-1 T+1 T+2 
Argentina Jan-02 Yes -
16.3
-3.4 1.3 14.8 12.3 
(e) 
-1.7 9.8 6.0 
(e) 
Indonesia Aug-97 Yes -2.1 -8.8 1.0 13.6 10.3 -3.3 4.4 4.1 
Thailand Jul-97 No -1.5 -11.9 -
1.4 
18.5 14.9 -5.0 12.7 10.1 
Turkey Feb-01 No -2.2 -9.3 -
1.8 
7.2 3.3 -4.9 2.3 -0.3 
Russia Aug-98 Yes -8.1 2.2 3.6 17.2 21.3 -0.7 11.5 17.0 
Ecuador Feb-99 (1) Yes -7.3 
- 
2.5 -
7.3 
12.1 12.1 -10.6 6.7 6.7 
Mexico Dec-94 No -0.4 -7.0 -
4.2 
4.2 3.4 -7.1 -0.6 -0.7 
Korea Nov-97 No -4.6 -6.0 -
0.4 
15.3 8.1 -1.7 12.7 6.0 
Brazil Jan-99 No -0.4 3.4 -
2.3 
-1.5 -1.2 -4.2 -4.7 -4.0 
Uruguay Jun-02 No -
13.6
-3.0 
(e) 
-
2.4 
1.6 
(e) 
3.4 
(e) 
-2.9 1.5 
(e) 
 
(1) Date on which it abandoned the exchange-rate band. In January 2000 the rate was 
set at US$/ECS 25,000. 
Source: BBVA. 
 
Although 2003 appeared to herald the end of the Argentine depression, on a medium-
term view the situation remains unsettled. The crisis of 2002 left a number of pending 
issues, the following among them. 
 
•  Compensate the banks for the losses they were forced to take when the fixed 
US$/peso exchange rate was adopted, using an exchange rate other than one-to-
one and adjusted differently for deposits and loans, as well as regularising 
provisioned claims which have left bank balance sheets hopelessly distorted. 
• Negotiate with international creditors a consolidation agreement on the country’s 
overseas debt. 
• Reach a definitive consolidation agreement, not a perpetual series of roll-overs, 
with the IMF and other multilateral lenders. 
• Structure and improve the existing primary public revenue surplus, which is 
currently garnered from withdrawal taxes levied on overseas earnings and thus 
constitutes a disincentive for exports. The government will also have to drop the 
duty charged on financial transactions. Finally, the system of transferring 
resources to the provinces, governed by the Federal Co-Participation Tax Act, 
needs reforming. 
• Negotiate higher prices to be charged by the public service utilities; the prices of 
utility services were frozen when the currency was devalued. 
 
If the Argentine government and Argentine society are capable of implementing these 
essential structural reforms, the economic prospects in the medium term are promising. 
Such reforms can be seen as a firm commitment to a market economy and to Argentina 
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becoming a significant player in the international financial and trading environment. If they 
fail, Argentina will almost certainly face a long period of stagnant growth. 
 
Impact on Spain: Trade Contagion 
The Spanish economy underwent accelerated internationalisation in recent years. The 
degree of its openness to trade, measured as the sum of real exports and imports over 
GDP rose from 33.0% in 1990 to 63.5% in 2002. This greater openness to trade means 
that the Spanish economy is more vulnerable to external shocks, such as the crisis in 
Argentina. That said, the amount of trade with Argentina is very little, thus limiting the 
knock-on effects of reduced exports to the Southern Cone (6). According to figures used 
by the Spanish department of Trade and Tourism, exports to Argentina in 1995-98 
represented approximately 1.2% of the total exports of Spanish goods. After four years of 
recession, exports to Argentina were practically non-existent. Finally, with the devaluation 
in 2002, they accounted for only 0.2% of all Spanish trade. 
 
One way of measuring trade contagion is by ceteris paribus analyses. We can assume 
that Spanish exports to Argentina remained at the same level as in 1998 and from there 
reconstruct the curve they would have described had the crisis not occurred (8). Next we 
assume that the other items making up GDP also remained unchanged (9)
 
and the result 
is an adjusted GDP which measures the effect of the Argentine crisis. This means of 
measuring trade contagion is open to objection as it ignores all indirect effects (such as 
the search for alternative markets). However, the figure to emerge is broadly speaking 
conservative, as it assumes as reasonable zero growth in exports in the absence-of-crisis 
hypothesis. Exact or not, it gives us an estimate of the quantitative cost of the Argentine 
crisis via the trade channel. 
 
The results show that trade contagion was not negligible. The Spanish economy grew by 
2.0% in 2002. If the crisis in Argentina had not stifled Spanish exports to that country, 
GDP growth for Spain would have been 2.1%. In other words the Argentine crisis 
subtracted one decimal point from Spain’s 2002 growth which, if we accumulate the same 
figure from 1998 to 2002, rises to two decimal points. Thus, whereas the cumulative 
growth of the Spanish economy between the years 1998 and 2002 was 13.7%, if the 
Argentine crisis were excluded it would have been 13.9%. In short, the Argentine crisis 
subtracted about two percentage points from the Spanish economy as a result of trade 
contagion, equivalent to €1.4 billion in 2002. 
 
Impact on Spain: the Cost for Companies Operating in Argentina (10) 
Without doubt the Argentine crisis carried a cost for Spanish firms operating there. It is, 
however, a difficult cost to measure. According to the paper by Blázquez and Sebastián 
(2003), there are three ways of measuring the negative effect the crisis had on foreign 
companies. 
 
The first is straightforward economics. All crises affect the remuneration of capital. This is 
because the recession presupposes an adverse economic environment that reduces 
return on investment. In addition, this fall in ROI is common to both domestic and foreign 
companies. On this basis, the Argentine crisis was a four-year recession resulting in a 
cumulative fall in GDP of around 18%. However, there was another negative effect of the 
crisis which affected foreign companies more than it did their domestic peers: the severe 
depreciation of the currency. A Spanish company investing abroad values its expected 
return on that investment in euros, not in local currency. Thus, depreciation of the 
Argentine peso, which at one stage reached 70%, has a very negative effect on the 
valuation of the overseas investments of foreign companies both on their balance sheets 
and their results statements. When due account is taken of the combined effect of the 
recession and of the devaluation on the economic value of those foreign investments, we 
discover that value fell by about 71%. 
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To gauge the losses suffered by Spanish companies we need to know how much they 
invested previously. According to the Argentine Ministry of the Economy, total Spanish 
investments in Argentina as at 31 December 2001 stood at US$20.0 billion. (11).
 
Of these 
we assume that they lost US$14.0 billion (€15.0 billion at the average US$/€ exchange 
rate of 2002), equivalent to 2.2% of Spanish GDP. This does not mean that Spain’s GDP 
would have risen by 2.2% had Argentina not had its crisis. The result should be 
interpreted in terms of reduced wealth or, more specifically, of the reduced value of 
Spanish companies. 
 
Another way of evaluating the cost of the crisis for Spanish companies is by using a 
bookkeeping approach. In Spain’s case, the Institute of Accounting and Account Auditing 
(ICAC) worked out rules for recording the effects of the Argentine devaluation on the 
consolidated statements of Spanish companies. To avoid erring one way or the other, the 
rules established certain minimums, meaning that real bookkeeping losses may, in fact, 
have been greater. This is for two reasons: first the devaluation estimated by the ICAC for 
accounting purposes was 40%, versus an observed average devaluation in 2002 of 68%. 
Secondly, some companies, taking an even more conservative line, recorded on their 
books losses in excess of those stipulated by the ICAC. According to the ICAC estimates, 
the losses of Spanish companies with affiliates in Argentina amounted to € 9.6 billion, 
equivalent to 1.4% of the Spanish GDP. 
 
The third and last valuation method is based on the market value of the companies 
concerned. This approach compares the market value of the parent companies with that 
of their European peers, as represented by the market performance of the corresponding 
European industry. For example, you can compare the performance of the shares of the 
Santander Group with those of the European banking sector. The difference in 
performance is attributed to the Argentine crisis. In a study conducted by Blázquez and 
Sebastián (2003) the market performance of Spanish Ibex-35 companies with interests in 
Argentina was analysed in this way with the result that the cost of the Argentine crisis 
came to €6.2 billion, equivalent to 0.9% of Spanish GDP. 
 
As stated, these figures should not be interpreted in terms of lost growth but as lost 
wealth. In other words, the Argentine crisis meant a balance-sheet loss for Spanish 
companies –they lost enterprise value. 
 
However, there was also an effect on Spain’s economic performance. The costs borne by 
the parent companies and negative stock-market performances left Spanish companies at 
a disadvantage when it came to reinvesting, which does affect growth. The problem is that 
no one has yet worked out a valid way of evaluating the impact of a poor balance sheet 
on company investment and, thus, on growth. A rough but conservative approximation 
would have to be qualitative. The Argentine crisis must have cost the Spanish economy 
something via non investment in productive capacity. The exact amount of that cost we do 
not know. 
 
Quantitatively, however, we can hazard a guess. It is a guess, and we make no bones 
about this. It consists of estimating what part of the known cost of the crisis would 
otherwise have been invested in productive capacity. According to the bookkeeping 
approach (12)
 
companies had to write off some €9.6 billion, part of which could have been 
invested. Arbitrarily, we assume that only 20% of that amount (€1.9 billion) would have 
been invested. Nominal investment in productive capacity in 2002 was €72.1 billion. To 
this we add our figure of €1.9 billion. We observe from this that real investment in 
productive capacity would have risen by 0.4%, as opposed to the fall observed in 2002 of 
0.2% (13).
 
Given this growth and assuming all other factors constant, we obtain a GDP 
growth in 2002 of 2.3%, instead of the 2.0% recorded. In other words, the Argentine crisis, 
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by means of its impact on the balance sheets of Spanish companies, removed three 
decimal points from growth. Once again, we stress that this calculation must be looked on 
with caution. 
 
Impact on Spain: Argentine Immigration 
The severity of the Argentine crisis could be clearly seen in its effect on living conditions, 
which deteriorated significantly since the end of 1998. Real wages since 1999 fell by 16% 
in local currency and 67% in dollar terms. Unemployment in October 2002 was at 18%, 
compared with 12% in October 1998. Finally, the number of households below the poverty 
line in greater Buenos Aires rose to 42%, from 18% in October 1998. Aside from its 
impact on law and order, the gravity of the crisis started a major exodus. 
 
According to the National Migration Department of the Argentine government, some 
250,000 people (14)
 
left the country since 2000, with Spain and Italy being the most 
favoured destinations, ahead of the United States (15). According to the same records, 
between 1993 and 1999 only 41,000 had emigrated, thus showing the demographic 
impact of the crisis over the last few years. The estimates are that in 2001 and 2002 some 
60,000 Argentines came to Spain with the idea of setting up home here (16). Spanish 
immigration statistics are equally vague, given that many Argentines either have an EU 
passport or enter as tourists, making it difficult to say exactly how many decide to reside 
here. As an example, according to the records of the Ministry of the Interior, in 2002 
alone, 128,312 Argentines arrived in Spain as tourists, whereas only 18,742 returned to 
Argentina when their visas expired. From these figures we must deduce that 110,000 
Argentines remained in Spain as illegal immigrants (17).
 
These figures will give the reader 
an idea of the difficulty in establishing with precision exactly how many Argentines came 
to Spain as a consequence of the crisis. 
 
Immigration should not be seen as a cost, but as a gain for Spain. On average, Argentine 
immigration represents an influx of skilled labour which has no problem in adjusting to 
Spanish living conditions. Given the lack of firm statistics, to assess the quantitative effect 
without risk of upward distortion, we assume a figure of 60,000 Argentine immigrants. If 
we also assume that this additional workforce behaves very much as the domestic 
workforce, we can deduce that 11.4% (18) of these immigrants will be currently 
unemployed. By the same yardstick, this means that 53,100 Argentines found work in 
Spain between 2001 and 2002, equivalent to 6% of the total number of new jobs created 
in the period according to the Survey of the Working Population (EPA). If, finally, we 
assume that the productivity of Argentine immigrants is the same as that of Spaniards, 
they will have contributed approximately 0.3 decimal points to GDP in 2002 (19). 
 
Impact on Spain: Channels for Financial Contagion 
The financial channel is the most usual source of contagion (20)
 
among emerging 
economies. When a crisis occurs in an emerging economy, the confidence placed in that 
economy declines further than that placed in the rest of the emerging economies. In risk 
management terms this is normally described as the increase in ‘risk aversion’. Risk 
aversion often gives rise to the ‘herd effect’, an undiscriminating stampede away from 
securities issued by all emerging countries. The drop in confidence initiates a process of 
disinvestment which raises the risk premium attaching to the emerging economies. 
However, the developed economies usually benefit from what is known as the ‘safe haven 
effect’, ie, investment funds abandon the emerging economies and head for the safer 
assets of the developed economies. Which side of the fence Spain is on in this context is 
unclear: it may suffer both effects simultaneously. There are obvious links by which some 
financial contagion between Spanish and Argentine assets is highly probable, given 
Spain’s numerous economic interests in Argentina. But it is equally true that Spain is a 
developed economy and, thus, a safe haven. 
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(a) ‘Sovereign Spread’ 
To gauge potential financial contagion we first analyse the performance of Argentina’s 
‘sovereign spread’ (21)
 
in comparison with that of Spain (22). To this end we focus on the 
period between October 1997 and December 2001, ie, up until the time of when Argentina 
defaulted on its debt repayments. We divide this time horizon into two types of sub-period: 
calms and storms, depending on the performance of the Argentine spread. If financial 
contagion is present, it should show up in the volatility of the yield on Spanish treasury 
bonds. 
 
The figures show that Spain was not affected by contagion from the Argentine crisis via 
this channel. At the time of the Russian crisis, from August to October of 1998, there was 
a small contagion. Spain, as Argentina, suffered from the nervousness of international 
investors and the spreads of both countries deteriorated in parallel. For some 
unfathomable reason, Spain was considered a ‘not entirely reliable’ economy and 
subjected to the same ups and downs as those exhibited by the economies of the 
emerging countries. However, from the time of Spanish membership of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) the correlations between the two spreads practically vanish. In 
fact, in the final period of volatility (March to December of 2001) prior to the Argentine 
default, there was a negative correlation that suggests a possibility that the market 
decided that Spanish bonds had become ‘safe’ assets. If so, from now on, and thanks to 
the euro, any crisis in emerging economies such as that of Argentina will favour the 
relative performance of Spanish bonds. In short, financial crises in emerging economies, 
instead of having a negative effect, have a positive effect on the performance of Spanish 
treasury bonds. 
 
 
Table 2. Spread Contagion 
 
 Period Average spread (basis points) Correlation 
  Spain Argentina  
Calm October 97 - July 98  27 461 0,20 
Storm August 98 - October 98  40 776 0,65 
Calm November 98 - May 99  27 689 -0,29 
Storm June 99 - August 99  27 814 -0,17 
Calm October 99 - February 01  26 665 0,58 
Storm March 01 - December 01  31 1.684 -0,72 
Source: Clearing house statistics. 
 
(b) Direct Cost of the Argentine Default 
Another source of contagion relates to holdings of Argentine bonds by Spanish residents. 
Debt default reduces the value of Argentine bonds which, in turn, reduces the financial 
worth of their holders. According to statistics compiled by Merrill Lynch, as at 31 
December 2001, Spanish fund managers (23)
 
held some US$10 millions’ worth of 
Argentine bonds out of a total stock of such bonds of US$4.6 billion, ie, about 0.2%. 
 
An interesting point is that Merrill Lynch’s figures only relate to a small part of the 
Argentine debt. The face value of the bonds held by private foreign investors currently 
stands at US$48.2 billion, but the identity of those investors is largely unknown. This is not 
a peculiarity of Argentine bonds; it occurs in all economies that use bond issues to fund 
the country’s debt. It explains why restructuring a national debt is often a long and painful 
process. Governments do not know who their creditors are and it requires a lengthy 
period of investigation to gather together a representative body to negotiate with (24).
 
This 
being the only information available, we proceed on the basis that Spanish fund managers 
hold 0.2% of the total Argentine national debt held by private overseas investors, ie, 
US$96.4 million. 
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Using these figures we can roughly gauge the maximum losses suffered by Spanish 
holders of Argentine bonds. Using the dollar-denominated Argentine sovereign bond issue 
‘Global 2008’ as benchmark (25), we see that the average traded price in 2002 was 
US$ 24.40 whereas the face value was US$100.00. Simplifying, this means that the face 
value of US$ 96.4 million is worth, in reality US$23.5 million. So, the net loss to the 
Spanish economy of the Argentine default can be estimated at US$72.9 million, 
equivalent to €86.7 million at the average exchange rate of 2002. Clearly, this figure is 
very low, showing that the impact via the channel was very small. 
 
The financial wealth invested in fixed-interest securities, ie, bonds, by Spanish 
households in 2002 was approximately €561.1 billion. This means that the direct loss from 
default on fixed-interest wealth would have been approximately 0.01%; negligible, in other 
words. 
 
(c) Stock-market Contagion 
The third and most important source of financial contagion is related to the market value 
of the stock of Spanish companies. As explained earlier, the Spanish presence in 
Argentina at company level is significant. Understandably, the Argentine affiliates of these 
companies suffered the cost of the crisis, which had negative repercussions also on their 
parent companies in Spain. What is less understandable but almost certainly true, is that 
the shares of other Spanish companies, having no subsidiaries in Argentina, also 
suffered. This is what is considered stock-market financial contagion. In other words, a 
crisis in an emerging economy (Argentina) generates risk aversion which causes 
investors to dispose of all assets which they no longer regard as safe, viz. those traded on 
the Spanish stock market. 
 
In short, the Spanish stock market paid double for the Argentine crisis. On one hand, it 
paid through the affiliates of its listed companies in Argentina. On the other, all the listed 
companies were affected by stock-market financial contagion. The result, from one 
channel or the other, was a net fall in the financial wealth of Spanish households. 
 
Graph 2. Stock market index (August 1998 = 100) 
 
 
 
One of the distinguishing features of the Argentine crisis was the slow pace at which it 
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took hold of the country. Following the Russian crisis of August 1998 the Argentine 
economy went into a gradual decline resulting in the explosive crash of early 2002. 
Logically, the Argentine stock market had registered the decline preceding the crash. 
Also, we can observe from the chart that over the period the Spanish market (measured 
by the Ibex-35) appeared to behave more like its Argentine counterpart (Merval) than the 
European average (Bloomberg 500) (26). 
 
Table 3. Average Yearly Yield 
(%) IBEX-35 Bloomberg 500 Merval
1999 9 15 -12
2000 9 23 3
2001 -19 -18 -27
2002 -21 -21 9
 
One way of gauging the stock-market cost of the Argentine crisis is to assume that, in the 
absence of such a crisis, the Spanish bourse would have performed in line with the other 
European bourses, as measured by the Bloomberg 500 index. Objections may be raised 
here on two counts. Firstly, the European economy taken as a whole and the Spanish 
economy, taken separately, performed differently, a circumstance that affects the stock 
markets, too. However, this argument, perfectly valid though it is, lends support to the 
idea that, in fact, there was a degree of contagion, as Spanish economic growth was 
higher than the European average. The stock-market indexes, however, say just the 
opposite. Despite the dangers, this is possibly the best way of tracing the contagion effect 
on the Spanish stock market. If Spanish companies had not been present in Argentina, 
there seems little to object to the view that the Spanish stock market would have 
performed at a level much closer to that of the average of the other European bourses. 
 
Graph 3. Financial Wealth Variable (in millions of euros) 
 
 
 
Using this approach it is possible to reconstruct the theoretical performance of Spain’s 
financial wealth variable. (27).
 
This variable, adjusted to take account of the Argentine 
crisis, can be obtained by assuming that, were it not for the crisis, the Spanish stock-
market would have performed in line with the European average. As we see, there is a 
constant gap between the original and the adjusted series denoting that Spain–Europe 
performance disparity. 
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The lower financial wealth variable of the Spanish economy has a measurable economic 
impact. It works as follows. The Argentine crisis pushes down the market value of Spanish 
stocks, thereby having a negative effect on the wealth variable of Spanish households. 
Households, in turn, reduce their consumption, thereby affecting economic growth. To 
measure this effect we use a long-term consumption model designed by Balmaseda and 
Tello (2002). According to this model, the level of consumption is in positive correlation 
with financial wealth and the stock of available housing. To evaluate the cost of the 
Argentine crisis in terms of private consumption we undertook a ceteris paribus study, 
substituting our previously adjusted series for the recorded financial wealth variable. 
 
 
Table 4. Private Consumption Variable 
Dependent variable: private 
consumption 
Coefficient Statistical ‘t’
Constant  2.19 3.88  
Disposable income  0.50 4.51  
Wealth:   
in variable income  0.05 8.04  
in fixed income  0.11 2.73  
real estate  0.10 5.49  
Source: Balmaseda and Tello (2002). 
 
Thus, the financial wealth variable fell as a result of the Argentine crisis by approximately 
20%. Given the elasticity of private consumption with respect to financial wealth, the 
reduction in consumption would have been around 1.0% (28). Now, private consumption 
accounts for approximately 58.4% of Spain’s GDP. In other words, if we assume that the 
other items contributing to GDP remained constant, the measurable fall in GDP was 0.6 
decimal points. 
 
Conclusions 
The Argentine crisis was an exceptional event both in duration (four years) and intensity 
(a cumulative fall in GDP of 18%). In addition, it had significant collateral effects. One of 
the economies potentially most exposed to the crisis was that of Spain, due to the major 
presence of large Spanish companies in Argentina. Although the economic and business 
ties between Spain and Argentina are clear for all to see, very little work has been done 
on measuring the cost to the Spanish economy of the Argentine crisis. This study is an 
attempt to fill that gap. 
 
The channels capable of transmitting such contagion are many and varied. Also, in most 
cases they are channels whose effects are difficult to measure quantitatively. However, in 
this article we attempt to gauge the impact of the Argentine crisis on the Spanish 
economy, while warning that the figures should be handled with care. 
 
Thus, the contagion channels, not all of which are negative, number six (three real-
economy channels and three financial channels). The real-economy channels are trade, 
business and immigration. The financial channels are bond markets, direct cost of default 
and the stock-market knock-on effect on financial wealth. The channels and their 
estimated effects are shown in the following figure. 
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Table 5. Summary of Impact 
 Cumulative impact on GDP 1998–2002 
(%)
Trade contagion -0.2
Financial contagion: 
       Bond markets +0.0
       Cost of default -0.0
       Stock markets -0.6
Immigration +0.3
Business -0.3
Total -0.8
Source: RIE. 
 
We therefore conclude that the Argentine crisis may have reduced Spanish economic 
growth over the period 1999-2000 by 0.8 decimal points. Between 1998 and 2002 the 
Spanish economy grew in real terms by 13.7%. According to our calculations, had it not 
been for the Argentine crisis, the figure would have been 14.5%. 
 
We can end the report on a final ceteris paribus exercise. In 2002 Spain’s nominal GDP 
was €693.9 billion. If we adjust this figure to account for the negative impact of the 
Argentine crisis, nominal GDP would move up to €699.5 billion. In other words, the cost of 
the Argentine crisis to the Spanish economy may be calculated at €5.6 billion at their 2002 
value. 
 
Jorge Blázquez 
BBVA Research Department  
Miguel Sebastián 
Lecturer in Quantitative Economics, Universidad Complutense, Madrid 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
(1) Our thanks to the suggestions received from Manuel Balmaseda, Julián Cubero and 
Luciana Taft in the course of writing this article. The results and conclusions are entirely 
the authors’ and do not necessarily correspond to those of the BBVA or the Complutense 
University of Madrid  
(2) Internationalisation of the Spanish economy took place relatively quickly. Of the 
various works focusing on this phenomenon in detail, see Chislett (2002). 
(3) See Chislett (2003). 
(4) Worth reading here is the recent study by Dages and García-Herrero (2003) on 
the impact of the crisis on the Argentine banking system. After evaluation the costs 
caused by the crisis, the authors report that foreign banks absorbed most of them. 
(5) Criticism of the issue of so-called ‘quasi money’, ie, means of payment in the form of 
bonds issued by the provincial or by central government (for example, the patacones of 
the province of Buenos Aires or the lecop issued by central government) is largely 
unjustified. Admittedly, such instruments came to represent 34% of the money supply, but 
the payment loop of the Argentine economy had broken down completely through lack of 
liquidity (capital flight, corralitos and corralones, etc) and the absence of a monetary 
multiplier. 
(6) Madrazo (2003) conducts an exhaustive study on trade between Spain and Argentina. 
He also analyses the impact up to July 2002 on this part of the economy of the 
devaluation of the Argentine peso. 
(7) This means of measuring the trade impact suffers from a certain degree of 
endogeneity, given that the value of exports to Argentina goes down as a result of the 
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devaluation. 
(8) Given that Spain’s national accounting figures do not itemise by country, the following 
rule of thumb is adopted. The ratio of exports to Argentina to Spain’s total exports, 
according to customs returns, is the same as that given in the national accounting returns. 
(9) In other words, public and private consumption, gross fixed capital formation, imports 
and changes in inventories are assumed constant, allowing only export performance to 
fluctuate. 
(10) In this section we follow the work in this area done by Blázquez and Sebastián 
(2003). 
(11) The CEPAL figure for cumulative Spanish investment between 1992 and 2001 is 
US$26.3 billion. 
(12) We employ this method of evaluating the cost of the crisis on Spanish companies 
as it seems to us the best suited to our ends. 
(13) To carry out the comparison we assumed that the investment deflator for capital 
goods remained unchanged. 
(14) Figures are approximate, as the Office estimates migratory flows as the difference 
between Argentines leaving the country and Argentines returning. 
(15) Unlike Spain and Italy, the United States demands a visa. 
(16) This figure, also, is an estimate; there are no reliable statistics. 
(17) As a matter of information, the number of Argentines residing legally in Spain in 2001 
was 20,410, according to the Police Department of the Ministry of the Interior. 
(18) Average for 2002. 
(19) This is probably an underestimate as, in general, Argentine immigrants are highly 
skilled. 
(20) For a summary of the economic theories behind financial contagion see Blázquez 
and Sebastián (2002). 
(21) The spread is the difference between the yield of Argentine dollar-denominated long-
term treasury bonds and bonds of the same maturity issued by the United States. 
(22) This spread is based on the difference between the yield of a Spanish ten-year euro-
denominated bond and a bond of the same maturity issued by the German State. 
(23) Some Spanish companies hold sovereign Argentine bonds. But the cost of default for 
these holders is covered in Section 5, which deals with the cost of the default for 
companies. 
(24) As an illustration, the first task of Lazard Frères, the consultants selected by the 
Argentine government to restructure the national debt held by overseas creditors, was to 
build a database of bondholders. 
(25) It is generally agreed to be  the most representative of the Argentine bond issues in 
foreign currency. 
(26) The Bloomberg 500 tracks the five hundred largest European companies measured 
by market capitalisation. 
(27) This variable is defined as Spanish market capitalisation plus unlisted equity held by 
fund managers. To simplify matters, financial wealth is assumed to perform in line with the 
stock market. 
(28) This is long-term elasticity, meaning that the effects on activity are not 
immediate but spread over a number of years. However, given the disparate 
performance of the Spanish and the European bourses in 1999 and 2000, we 
assume that all effects took place between 1999 and 2002. 
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